Variability and Growth in Grain Yields, 1950-94: Does the Record Point to Greater Instability?
RosAMoND NAYLOR WALTER FALCON ERIKA ZAVALETA THE "RACE" BETWEEN population and food is a classic theme, yet the outcome of this contest is of enduring contemporary interest. Interestingly, the two variables that are set opposite one another in the race are fundamentally different in character. Population is primarily a stock concept that rises monotonically (when births exceed deaths), whereas food production is overwhelmingly a flow variable that exhibits substantial year-to-year fluctuations.' These latter fluctuations, in turn, cause significant economic and nutritional consequences at the household level. The changes are especially important for the poor, even beyond the consequences caused by trend levels of food consumption per capita. In addition, amplifications of price and production variability often produce compensating changes in national food policies. If countries seek to stabilize domestic grain prices, the unintended effect of these actions is further destabilization of global grain markets.2
Assessing the pattern of these annual fluctuations in cereal yields with respect to their magnitude, geographic incidence, and change over time is thus of evident interest in questions concerning food security. This article was motivated, in particular, by cereal prices in the 1995-96 period. Global stock-to-flow ratios for grain reached modern-time lows in 1996; world prices for wheat and corn rose 40 and 60 percent, respectively, between mid-1995 and mid-1996; and publicly held grain stocks were reduced in leading surplus countries in response to provisions of the Uruguay Round of the GATT (World Bank 1996) . By the end of 1996, however, good weather plus supply responses by farmers from around the world caused cereal prices to decline sharply to "normal" levels.
Whether 1996 represented a fundamental turning point for the trend in real food prices has been hotly debated. Irrespective of the conclusion on that issue, however, there is growing interest in whether or not yield variability for staple grains is increasing disproportionately in relation to average yield levels. Observers put forth two contrasting views-often implicitly. One view holds that yield variability is likely to have increased because of climate change, widespread pesticide use coupled with consequent resistance among pests and pathogens, and reduced genetic diversity of the cultivars being planted in most fields. An alternative view suggests that significant investments by the private sector, national agricultural programs, and international centers have reduced variability by producing genetic material less subject to stresses caused by temperature extremes, moisture shortages, or pest infestations. Mostly we note, however, that authors assessing current and future world-food scenarios deal only with smooth trends. Lead articles in this journal by Ehrlich, Ehrlich, and Daily (1993) and Smil (1994) are typical of those found throughout the foodpopulation literature with respect to the focus on production levels as opposed to production variability.
As a complement to other analyses, we assess the growth and variability of corn, wheat, and rice yields from 1950 to 1994 on a global and regional basis. We focus specifically on yields for two reasons: most of the variability in world cereal production since 1950 has been due to yield instability (Hazell 1985 (Hazell , 1989 Singh and Byerlee 1990; Anderson et al. 1988) , and yield variability directly reflects changes in agroclimatic, resource, and technological conditions, as well as changes in economic stimuli and input availability. Our main objective is to examine actual trends in yield variability in recent decades, rather than to explain why such trends have occurred. The focus is thus on data and measurement, which are fundamental issues in determining whether or not yield instability is increasing.
A number of studies were published on grain yield instability following the introduction and dissemination of improved varietal-and fertilizer-based technologies in the developing world. (See, for example Singh and Byerlee 1990; Anderson and Hazell 1989; and Hazell 1984 and Hazell , 1985 and Hazell , and 1989 Since the purpose of these earlier studies was to compare yield variability in pre-and post-Green Revolution periods, the analyses generally began in the 1950s and ended in the mid-1980s, by which time technological change was consolidated in many developing regions. To our knowledge, no studies extend the analysis into the mid-1990s in order to capture the yield effects of more recent environmental and technological changes.
In viewing the data for the past half-century, it is no surprise to find that yield variability (in absolute kilograms per hectare) has increased with the growth in yield levels. The question is whether variability associated with agricultural intensification and environmental change, especially during the past decade or so, is increasing relative to the growth in output levels. We begin by discussing recent growth trends in cereal yields in or-43 der to establish a basis for an analysis of variability. We then turn to the issue of yield instability and examine patterns of variability over time and for different regions and crops. Yield growth and variance are compared over three time periods: 1950-64, a period that represents the pre-Green Revolution stage in developing countries and a time of rapid technological change in developed countries; 1965-79, a time of major technological change in the developing world as Green Revolution technologies were introduced and disseminated; and 1980-94, a period that reflects the postGreen Revolution stage in many developing countries and continued consolidation of technological change in developed countries (Byerlee 1996; Singh and Byerlee 1990) .
Our analysis focuses on yield variability in corn, wheat, and rice, since these crops have been at the center of research and breeding efforts related to agricultural intensification during the past 50 years. Direct consumption of these grains accounts for approximately 48 percent of total calorie intake and 44 percent of total protein intake globally (FAO 1992) . Their contribution to the human diet is even greater when feed grains, such as corn, are considered. In choosing these three crops, we are thus focusing on the critical patterns of stability and instability in global grain markets.
Corn, in particular, is likely to play an increasingly important role in the stability of world cereal markets. Global production of corn rose from 131 million tons to 570 million tons between 1950 and 1994, during which time annual international trade in corn went from roughly 10 million tons to 75 million tons (FAO various years; CIMMYT 1994) . In our analysis, as in several previous analyses of cereal production variability (e.g., Hazell 1989 ), corn yields demonstrate significant and growing instability in recent decades. This trend has been pronounced not only in poorly developed regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, but also in highly developed, productive areas. The latter are typified by North and Central Americaincluding the United States, a major producer and exporter of corn in the world market. In the final section of our study, therefore, we focus on patterns of corn yield variability in the United States. We look specifically at long-term trends in US corn yields, the sensitivity of these trends to the time period of analysis, and the contribution of yield instability in the United States to global corn yield variability. As indirect consumption of grain through livestock production rises in many parts of the world, we conjecture that instability in the US corn market-and in the global corn market more generally-will play an even greater role in the future world food situation.
Yield levels and growth
Time-series data on corn, wheat, and rice yields for the world, developed and developing countries, and individual regions were taken from the FAO data base (FAO various years).3 Complete data series were available for the regions shown in Table 1 .4 Yield data for the former Soviet Union are included in the world average, but are not shown as a separate region because of changes in political boundaries (and consequent changes in FAO reporting methods).
The yield data in Table 1 indicate impressive and highly significant increases in yields for virtually all regions and crops between 1950 and 1994. On a global basis, corn, wheat, and rice yields roughly doubled over the period. The gap between developed and developing country yields decreased for rice and especially for wheat, reflecting the widespread and positive yield effects of a successful Green Revolution for these crops. For corn, the yield gap did not shrink over the period, which suggests that a Green Revolution for corn is yet to come (Anderson, Herdt, and Scobie 1988) .
The growth rates shown in Table 1 are taken directly from the coefficients of linear regressions that measure the natural log of yields against time for each of the three periods. Of the 81 coefficients shown in the table, all but 16 are significant at the 5 percent level, and 61 are significant at the 1 percent level. The results are impressive testimony to the importance of technological change in raising yield levels over the past 45 years, especially in developing countries. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence for corn and wheat of a decelerating growth of productivity during 1980-94 relative to 1965-79-although not for rice, which has maintained its 1.8 percent annual growth in global yields.
Measures and patterns of yield variability
In our analysis of yield instability among regions, crops, and time periods from 1950 to 1994, we ran simple linear regressions of yields against time for each period, using natural log transformations of the yield series as the dependent variable. This method was chosen for four reasons: (1) the natural log transformation eliminates much of the scale effect from yield growth by focusing on percentage changes rather than absolute changes; (2) the equation leads to immediate translations of yield growth rates from the slope coefficient; (3) significant differences in yield variation between periods can be tested straightforwardly with an F-test; and (4) the square root of the mean square error of the estimate provides a rough approximation of average percent deviation from trend for each period. We chose to run separate regressions for each period and to compare the residualsrather than to fit a single quadratic trend for the entire period-in order to identify discrete patterns of variance.
Our choice of using log-linear transformations differs from previous analyses of yield variability that measure changes in variation in the original (non-log) series with an adjusted coefficient of variation method.5 We argue that the use of percent changes is logical because cereal yields in most regions have roughly doubled over the period, which makes absolute deviations less meaningful. For example, the implication of a half-ton variation on a 4 ton/ha yield is considerably less than a half-ton variation on a 2 ton/ha yield. On the other hand, an increase in the percentage deviation from trend with a doubling of yields would suggest, a fortiori, that instability is rising both absolutely and relatively. Table 2 provides the main results of our analysis. One of the most striking conclusions to be drawn from these data is that yield variability for corn has expanded on a global basis, and most of that variability is occurring in the developed world, especially North America (see Figure 1) . Globally, the approximate average deviation has increased from about 2.7 to 7.1 percent annually. Although instability in corn yields has not increased in the developing world as a whole, there has been a significant rise in variability in Africa in the 1980-94 period.
Principal findings
The situation for wheat, as also shown illustratively for Asia in Figure  1 , is quite different. Yield variability for wheat has declined globally, and for both the developed and less developed world between 1950 and 1994 (although not significant at the 5 percent level). The general decline in variability between the pre-and post-Green Revolution periods (periods 1 and 3) is consistent with Singh and Byerlee's (1990) results that indicate a drop in variability through the mid-1980s.
A similar, but more distinct, pattern can be seen for rice. Yield variability declined significantly between the first and second periods for both developed and developing regions as a whole. A significant drop in variability was also seen in Asia with the onset of the Green Revolution, an important observation given that over 90 percent of the world's rice is produced and consumed in Asia. As in the case of wheat, some increase in yield variability occurred in developing countries between the second and third periods as technological change was consolidated; however, this increase was not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Nonetheless, now that the major gains from the Green Revolution technology for rice 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 have been achieved, and irrigation investments have started to taper off, it is possible that the pattern of increased variability for rice and wheat in the most recent period could become significant in the future (Naylor 1996) . 1960 1970 1980 1990 1960 1970 1980 1990 For developed countries, the increase in rice yield instability was significant in the 1980-94 period. The data in Table 2 do not include a separate regional grouping for the former Soviet Union, an important grain-producing area, because consistent data on yields for this region were not available for the entire 1950-94 period. As a substitute, we used FAO data from 1961 to 1990-the most consistent period of data available-and divided them into two 15-year periods (1961-75 and 1976-90) to analyze yield variability. As might be expected, variability in grain yields has been extremely large in the region. Figure 2 shows the pattern of yields for wheat, the region's dominant cereal crop, and corn, a much less important crop in terms of area sown. Virtually no rice is grown in the former Soviet Union. For both wheat and corn, yields have remained extremely unstable between 1961 and 1990, and there has not been a significant increase in yields over the period.
Instability in wheat and corn yields in the former Soviet Union reflects more than biological variation caused by weather, pests, and diseases. It also demonstrates economic and policy constraints on production, particularly with respect to input availability. In North and Central America, on the other hand, the significant increase in yield variability for corn in recent decades may be attributed with more certainty to biological and climate conditions. Although the yield frontier for corn is expanding, it is being approached more closely in many of the largest corn-producing areas of North and Central America, especially in the United States (Duvick 1989 ). In addition, relatively few of the hectares of corn grown in these areas are irrigated.
Variability in US corn yields
The results shown in Table 2 suggest that corn yields have become relatively more unstable in recent decades in regions that are poorly devel-oped, such as Africa, as well as in regions where technology is well advanced, such as North/Central America and Europe. Since the United States is the largest producer of corn in the developed world, we now examine the pattern of rising instability in corn yields using a long-term data series from 1869 to 1994 assembled by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA, various years). With this long-term series, we can compare recent trends in yield levels and variability with those of earlier periods-that is, before major advances in corn technology occurred in the United States. We can also test the sensitivity of our results to the time periods of analysis, and assess the role that the United States plays in the stability or instability of the world corn market. Figure 3 shows the pattern of corn yields in the United States for the entire series.6 A kink exists in the yield trend in the 1930s; a sharp rise in yields occurred at this time when hybrids were introduced, and it was matched by greater variability. The question here is whether or not variability in yields increased significantly on a relative basis after 1930.
When the data are divided into two equal periods-1869-1931, which represents the "pre-technology' period, and 1932-94, which represents the "post-technology' period-a significant increase in variability is found (see Table 3 ). When the data are separated into three equal periods, however, the results are quite different. Variability increased significantly between the first period (1869-1910) and the second period (1911-52), but declined between the second period and the third period . These data indicate that conclusions on yield variability over time can be quite sensitive to the time period chosen for analysis.
To determine what actually happened in terms of yield instability in the period following World War II, therefore, requires a more disaggregated look at the data. Figure 4 shows the 1950-94 data divided into three 15-year periods, which is consistent with our analysis in the previous sec- 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 Year 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 firmly established in the second period , yield variation also became more significant. This pattern was even more striking in the third period , when the technology was well advanced and more farmers began to reach the yield ceiling. Sensitivity analysis on the time period of measurement confirms this pattern of increasing variability. When the entire 1950-94 period was divided into two, three, and four equal periods, a consistent result was obtained (see Table 4 ). Yield instability at the end of the series was higher than at the beginning and did not decline at any point in the period from 1950 to 1994.
The pattern of variability in US corn yields shown in Figure 4 and Table 4 correlates quite highly to that of corn yields in North/Central America, and even to world corn yields, discussed in the previous section. Indeed, instability in US corn yields appears to dominate global variation. To test this hypothesis, we ran regressions of the residuals from the world yield trend against the residuals from the US yield trend for the three main periods of analysis (see Table 5 ). The results indicate that patterns of variability in US corn yields are closely correlated with instability in the world yields. Moreover, the influence that US yield instability has on the world patterns increased over the period, as measured both by the slopes and by the proportion of the variance that is explained (the adjusted R2). bRatios of mean squared errors from regression: In y = a + bt. Significance is tested around an F-distribution. t95% critical value: 3-period test = 2.58 (13 degrees of freedom), 2-period test = 2.12 (20 degrees of freedom), 4-peniod test = 3.18 (9 degrees of freedom) aValues from the regression: Residual (world) = a + b*Residual (US), where residuals are determined by the regression Iny = a + bt for US and world corn yields. bThe t-values are in parentheses. The critical value is 2.16 for a two-tailed test at the 5 percent significance level with 13 degrees of freedom.
Conclusions and implications
The results presented here for the primary staple grains over time and across countries suggest that any broadly held notions of greatly increasing instability in global grain yields are probably wrong. Most important, yield variability has not risen significantly between 1950 and 1994 in the developing world as a whole. Instead, the main area of instability during the past decade has been corn production in North and Central America. The United States, in particular, has demonstrated large and increasing variation in corn yields. Africa is the only developing region that has shown a significant increase in corn yield variability in the 1980-94 period.
Generalizations about the magnitudes and causes of instability are few, but three conjectures seem warranted. First, weather still appears to be a dominant determinant of variability.8 Similarly, the growth of irrigation in Asia relative to Africa no doubt helps account for the relative size of their instability coefficients. Second, there is no evidence to date that the Green Revolution technology has in fact led to genetic or other vulnerabilities that, in turn, have induced greater yield instabilities. Breeding and management practices aimed at increasing tolerances to agroclimatic stresses generally appear to be working.
Phases of technology adoption are a third important element in determining patterns of instability.9 Figure 5 shows circumstances facing farmers in three situations. In resource-degraded situations (shown by the left bar of Figure 5 ), farmers may be having difficulties in sustaining current yields. In such circumstances, yields may be very sensitive to weather or other variables.10 Similarly, when farmers are at an early stage of adopting new varietal-based technologies, yields may also be quite variable (Singh and Byerlee 1990 ). A contrasting situation is shown by the middle bar of Figure 5 . If farm yields are low relative to the technical ceiling-and if yields are rising rapidly-then the absolute increase in yields over a given period is likely to swamp annual yield fluctuations. The outcome in such circumstances is for annual yields to be increasing monotonically. Even if there is some variation in the series-measured by a deviation from trend-the overwhelming perception among farmers and policymakers will be one of growth." Much of the original Green Revolution technology, for example, was put into use over a 15-year period. During this time, the adjusted coefficient of variation for wheat and rice was relatively small, and there was little talk about fluctuations in yields.
A third situation may be present if farm yields are near the yield ceiling, as shown by the right bar of Figure 5 . Even if the technical ceiling is rising a bit each year, a high proportion of the variability is caused by weather and is not offset by yield growth associated with technological adoption. Moreover, there appears to be an important interaction between improved technology and weather effects. New cultivars permit greater genetic expression of yield potential when weather and other conditions are favorable. When conditions are unfavorable, however, these cultivars have "further to fall" in terms of yields. Breeding for stress helps to mitigate such falls, but especially in the case of severe weather the negative impact on yields is still apparent.
Additionally, the fact that the coefficients in Table 2 are generally not increasing does not necessarily mean that they are already "small." Average annual deviations of 4.1 percent for wheat in 1980-94, for example, translate into about 22.5 million tons of wheat production annually on a global basis, or about twice the size of annual food aid. Deviations of this magnitude necessitate continual adjustments by both producers and consumers, and they also underscore the potential benefits from trade and from private and public stockholding. Table 2 displays average deviations-both positive and negative. From a policy perspective, however, sharp drops in yields seem to cause the most serious food-security problems (Timmer 1989).12 Table 6 provides data on the probability of negative yield deviations of more than 4 percent by crop, region, and time period.'3 Although the 4 percent level is chosen arbitrarily, the data provide some indication of when and where policy choices are likely to be made in response to yield instability.
For corn and wheat, it seems that one year in five is a fairly good estimate for a significant downturn in yields globally. For rice, one year in ten is now a better estimate, especially considering Asia's record and its position in world rice production. The chance of large yield downswings appears to have declined for rice, increased somewhat for corn, and remained roughly the same on balance for wheat. Once again, the areas that show increasing probabilities of yield shortfalls are in the developed worldcorn yields in North/Central America and wheat yields in Europe and Australia/New Zealand. Moreover, the likelihood of significant yield declines in wheat and corn is exceptionally high and appears to be rising for countries of the former Soviet Union.
The results on corn-yield instability in the developed world are especially interesting in the current context of the world food economy. Drought TABLE 6 Annual probability of a negative yield deviation of greater than 4 percent, 1950 -94 Corn Wheat Rice 1950 -64 1965 -79 1980 -94 1950 -64 1965 -79 1980 -94 1950 -64 1965 -79 1980 Table. conditions in many corn-growing regions of the United States have reduced yields for several years recently; at the same time, China's change in 1995 from exporter to importer in the global corn market, even if temporary, has added a potentially large and uncertain component to the market. As other middle-income countries also consume more meat in response to rising incomes, increased pressure will be placed on coarse grain markets, and on corn markets in particular. Indeed, corn could be the leading staple grain consumed (directly and indirectly) in the future. Further variation in corn yields in major surplus-producing areas could thus have a profound impact on the stability of global grain markets, especially given the increased linkages and substitutability among the cereals (Pearson 1990) . At the same time, there is considerable elasticity in the world food system for coping with the human consequences of yield variations, provided that appropriate economic signals are broadly transmitted. High prices in one year can draw forth more supplies in succeeding years; more variability in output can create additional opportunities for socially profitable storage; livestock herds can expand or contract depending on grain prices; and trade can often compensate for production shortfalls or surpluses in particular regions.'4 Increased yield variability thus does not signal disaster. But trade, livestock, or storage adjustments are not instantaneous, automatic, or costless. Sudden changes in yields or global grain prices often cause governments to adopt nationalistic food policies-sometimes lastingly so-as the after-effects of the 1973-74 food-price shock clearly demonstrated. Moreover, the human consequences, especially for the poor, tend to be nonlinear if annual shortfalls exceed 3 or 4 percent, or if a series of bad yields occur in sequential years. Even world-food "optimists" need to worry about the possible effects of two or three successive "bad" corn crops in the United States.
Finally, the results of this article invite more-extensive analysis of the causes of recent instability in developed-country corn yields. Annual weather fluctuations, long-term climate change, reductions in genetic diversity in the field, more synchronized methods of planting, and policy influences on management are all plausible contributors to this pattern of increased variability. It is not surprising that these factors initially would affect the stability of nonirrigated, intensively farmed corn systems, where modern seed technologies produce actual yields near the yield frontier. Over time, movements toward the yield frontier may well influence the stability of irrigated rice and wheat systems of the developing world as several of the largest developing countries, such as China, India, and Indonesia, steadily move toward those frontiers. Moreover, yield variation in both developed and developing countries could increase further if resource depletion, especially of irrigation water, is not compensated by conservation efforts and/or by expanded and improved irrigation systems.
example Anderson et al. (1988); Hazell (1989) ; Singh and Byerlee (1990) .
6 We retain the common practice of reporting US yields in bushels (bu) per acre. For shelled corn, one bushel equals 25.41 kg. One acre equals 0.405 hectare.
7 Panels b, c, and d of Figure 4 are simply disaggregated sections of panel a; hence the difference in vertical axis scales.
8 Tsonis (1996) argues, for example, that while global mean precipitation has not changed during the past century, "an overall positive trend in precipitation variability has occurred" (p. 702).
9 This point is also dealt with in a longer historical context by Plucknett (1993) . Figure 5 is adapted from this source.
10 The five large negative deviations in recent years for corn yields in the United States were 1970 States were , 1974 States were , 1983 States were , 1988 1993. In 1970, yields were affected dramatically by southern leaf blight, whereas yields in the other four years were affected by serious droughts.
11 A seven-year time series of yields composed hypothetically of the numbers 2.0, 2.1, 3.0, 3.1, 4.0, 4.1, and 5.0 tons per ha will show some years with negative deviations from a time trend; however, farmers and policymakers are unlikely to consider the yields of 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1 tons as "bad weather" or "poor crop" years, since they represent actual increases over the preceding year.
12 We are well aware that grain prices and food security also depend on areas harvested, levels of stocks, expectations among market participants, and on the co-variances of these variables with one another and with yields; however, our focus in this analysis is restricted to yield instability.
13 Actual percentage deviations for each of the three crops globally are shown for the period 1950-94 in the Appendix Table. 14 For a fuller discussion of the costs of price variation and the benefits of price stabilization, see Falcon (1995) and Timmer (1996a) .
